Rachel Winder, BA (Hons), QTLS, PgCert Autism, MA Autism
Author | Autistic-ADHD Autism Consultant | Researcher
Rachel Winder is an autistic-ADHD autism consultant, researcher, and trainer who integrates lived experience with academic scholarship to translate autistic perspectives into practical insight for families, educators, and organisations. She holds a BA (Hons) in Education Studies, QTLS status, a Level 6 qualification in British Sign Language, and a PgCert and MA in Autism from Sheffield Hallam University.
My work sits at the intersection of lived autistic experience, academic research, and applied systems practice. From this position, it becomes possible to examine the historical foundations of autism research while also recognising the limitations that emerge when autistic cognition is interpreted primarily through neurotypical reference points.
The discussion that follows explores how early cognitive theories of autism contributed to important scientific progress, while also embedding deficit-based assumptions that have influenced educational practice, policy development, and public understanding of autism. Situating these ideas within their historical context allows their contribution to be acknowledged while also examining how contemporary autistic scholarship is expanding the field.
Early cognitive theories of autism played an important role in the development of modern autism research. Work by researchers such as Uta Frith helped move the field away from harmful and scientifically unsupported explanations that attributed autism to parenting style, instead establishing autism as a neurodevelopmental condition worthy of rigorous scientific study.
However, the cognitive models that emerged during this period were largely constructed through comparison with neurotypical cognition. Frameworks such as theory of mind and weak central coherence interpreted autistic differences primarily as deficits relative to typical social and cognitive functioning. While these models generated influential research programmes, they also embedded a deficit-based interpretation of autism that has shaped public discourse, clinical practice, and policy for decades.
One of the most consequential outcomes of deficit-based interpretations was the historical assumption that some autistic individuals – particularly non-speaking autistic people – lacked internal cognitive complexity or meaningful understanding of the world around them. In many educational and clinical contexts, non-speaking autistic individuals were spoken about rather than spoken with, and decisions were frequently made on their behalf without meaningful attempts to access their perspectives. Subsequent developments in alternative and augmentative communication (AAC) and spelling boards have demonstrated that many individuals previously assumed to lack comprehension possess rich internal thought, complex understanding, and the capacity to communicate when provided with appropriate supports. (Definitely an area that is in desperate need of research conducted by and with non-speaking autistic individuals).
This history illustrates the risks inherent in interpreting behavioural differences as evidence of cognitive absence. It also reflects what philosopher Miranda Fricker describes as epistemic injustice – a situation in which individuals are unjustly discredited as knowers because of prejudice about their social identity. In the context of autism, epistemic injustice has often occurred when autistic people’s perspectives, insights, and lived experiences were dismissed or considered less credible than the interpretations of non-autistic observers.
Subsequent scholarship has increasingly challenged the assumption that social differences in autism represent a one-sided impairment. Luke Beardon (2008) proposed the concept of cross-neurological theory of mind, suggesting that misunderstandings between autistic and non-autistic individuals arise because each neurotype processes and interprets social information differently. Difficulties in communication therefore emerge from differences in neurological processing rather than a unilateral failure within autistic individuals.
This perspective was later expanded by Damian Milton through the Double Empathy Problem (2012), which reframes social breakdown as a relational phenomenon occurring between individuals with different neurocognitive styles. Research increasingly demonstrates that autistic people often communicate effectively with other autistic individuals, challenging earlier interpretations that framed autistic sociality primarily in terms of deficit.
Further support for this relational interpretation has emerged from studies examining interactions between autistic individuals themselves. Research by Elizabeth Sheppard and colleagues, as well as work by Catherine Crompton, has demonstrated that autistic people often communicate effectively and report higher levels of rapport when interacting with other autistic individuals. These findings challenge earlier assumptions that autistic social communication is inherently impaired. Instead, they suggest that many of the difficulties observed in mixed neurotype interactions arise from differences in communication styles and expectations rather than from a deficit located solely within autistic individuals. Such findings provide empirical support for interactional models of autism, including the Double Empathy framework.
Together, these developments mark a gradual shift within autism research from deficit-based interpretations toward relational and interactional models of social understanding.
Within this evolving context, contemporary concerns suggesting that autism may now be “over-diagnosed” risk reinforcing the very deficit assumptions that newer research has sought to challenge. Rising diagnostic prevalence is widely understood to reflect increased recognition, broader diagnostic criteria, and the identification of populations historically overlooked in earlier research, including women, masked autistic individuals, and adults diagnosed later in life. Interpreting this increase primarily through the lens of diagnostic inflation risks delegitimising the experiences of newly recognised autistic people and may contribute to increased gatekeeping within assessment and support systems.
The evolution of autism theory therefore highlights an important tension within the field. Early cognitive models helped legitimise autism as a subject of scientific inquiry, yet their deficit-oriented framing also shaped narratives that continue to influence how autism is interpreted socially and clinically. As autism research progresses, there is growing recognition that understanding autism requires moving beyond deficit comparisons toward frameworks that acknowledge neurological diversity, reciprocal social understanding, and the role of environmental context in shaping autistic experience.
This perspective aligns with Beardon’s formulation that outcomes for autistic individuals are not determined by autism alone, but by the interaction between neurological difference and environmental context: “Autism + Environment = Outcome” (Beardon, 2017, p. 11).
While Frith’s early work played an important role in establishing autism as a legitimate field of scientific study, contemporary public commentary from prominent researchers can also influence how autism continues to be understood. When such perspectives appear in interviews or media discussion, it is reasonable to ask why these views are being expressed at this particular moment, and to consider whether the framing being offered remains helpful for understanding the experiences of autistic people today.
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References
Beardon, L. (2008). Autistic Spectrum Conditions: A Guide for Professionals and Families. Sheffield: Pavilion Publishing.
Beardon, L. (2017). Autism and Asperger Syndrome in Adults. Sheffield Hallam University.
Crompton, C. J., Ropar, D., Evans-Williams, C., Flynn, E., & Fletcher-Watson, S. (2020). Neurotype-matching, but not being autistic, influences self and observer ratings of interpersonal rapport. Frontiers in Psychology.
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
Frith, U. (1989). Autism: Explaining the Enigma. Oxford: Blackwell.
Milton, D. (2012). On the ontological status of autism: The ‘double empathy problem’. Disability & Society.
Sheppard, E., Pillai, D., Wong, G., Ropar, D., & Mitchell, P. (2016). How easy is it to read the minds of people with autism spectrum disorder? Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders.